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The Christian Confession of God in the World of the Religions 
Donald Wood (University of Aberdeen) and David Gilland (Leuphana Universität 
Lüneburg) 
 
Draft for publication in translation as ‘Das christliche Bekenntnis zu Gott in der Welt 
der Religionen’ in M. Mühling, ed., Gott in den Religionen (Grundwissen 
Christentums) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). 
 
Christian confession, religious pluralism, and the knowledge of God 
 
From its earliest beginnings, the Christian church has confessed its faith in God the 
Father of Jesus Christ. In doing so, it continually has realised and publicly exhibited 
its own distinctive identity in the world: ‘Even though there may be so-called gods in 
heaven or on earth … yet we acknowledge only one God—the Father—from whom 
are all things and for whom we exist, and only one Lord—Jesus Christ—through 
whom are all things and through whom we exist.’ (1 Corinthians 8.5–6).1 Christian 
theology, broadly understood, is the church’s intellectual inhabitation of its 
confession, faith’s endeavour to know this God and all things in relation to God as 
their origin and end.2  
 Much recent study of early Christianity has sought to cast light on the complex 
and often conflicted processes of identity formation in which the first Christian 
churches forged a new communal sense of self by differentiating themselves in many 
and varying ways from culturally significant ‘others’. These nascent Christian 
communities—as also first-century ‘Judaism’ (itself a term of convenience for a 
complex, mobile network of social relations)—distinguished their faith from popular 
pagan polytheism and the ‘soft’ monotheisms of the philosophical schools by their 
commitment to a ‘hard’, particularist monotheism: for us there is only one God, and 
                                                
1 See Otfried Hofius, ‘«Einer ist Gott – Einer ist Herr»: Erwägungen zu Struktur und Aussage des 
Bekenntnisses 1.Kor 8,6’, in M. Evang, H. Merklein und M. Wolter (eds), Eschatologie und 
Schöpfung: Festschrift für Erich Gräßer zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Berlin and New York: de 
Gruyter, 1997), pp. 95–108.  
2 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a, q1, a7: Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione 
Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus; vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem. 
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this God properly bears this name.3 But the followers of Jesus Christ also actively 
distinguished themselves within and from developing Judaism through 
christologically informed practices of devotion, instruction, and service.4 Christian 
confession, accordingly, took shape not as a rejection or dilution of Jewish 
monotheism but as its christological specification: for us there is one God and one 
Lord. The one God, these Christians said, is the ‘Father’, one properly named in 
relation to Jesus, the Son of God who in the fulness of time has been manifest as 
Israel’s messiah and appointed creation’s Lord. 
This orientation to the cultural pragmatics of early Christian confession of 
God resonates with many recent discussions of the transformation of Christian 
identity in the late-modern west. Some such accounts focus on the ‘Erosion der 
gesellschaftlichen Bedeutung der Religion’ in post-Reformation Europe and predict a 
continuing decline of public adherence to the Christian faith.5 For others, the collapse 
of the cultural hegemony of Christianity in the west is an opportunity for Christian 
communities to recover a sense of Christian distinctiveness in conversation with many 
religious others. Thus in the analysis of Christoph Schwöbel, the key term is not 
‘secularization’ but ‘pluralism’, and to understand our current situation after the 
demise of Christendom, we need to recognise it as marking ‘the return of the situation 
of the early church, when the still young Christian movement had to determine its 
identity through the determination of the identity of the God in whom Christians 
believed.’6 Thus a theologically informed investigation of ‘[d]ie Grundprobleme der 
Verständigung und des Zusammenlebens im religiös-weltanschaulichen Pluralismus’7 
requires Christian theology reach back to the theological explorations of the early 
church, seeking to recover the intellectual integrity and cultural provocation of 
classical Christian doctrine—a provocation which for Schwöbel is distilled in the 
                                                
3 Cf. A.J. Droge, ‘Self-definition vis-à-vis the Greco-Roman world’, in Margaret M. Mitchell and 
Frances M. Young, Cambridge History of Christianity. Volume 1: Origins to Constantine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 230–44.  
4 On early Christian devotion to Christ, see Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ. Devotion to Jesus in 
Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003).  
5 See Manuel Franzmann, Christel Gärtner, Nicöle Kock, eds, Religiosität in der säkularisierten Welt.  
Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte in der Religionssoziologie 
(Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), p. 16; Steve Bruce, Secularization: In 
Defence of an Unfashionable Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
6 Christoph Schwöbel, ‘Trinitätslehre. Eine Skizze’, in Gott im Gespräch. Theologische Studien zur 
Gegenwartsdeutung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), pp. 407–22 (407). 
7 Christoph Schwöbel, Gespräch, p. xii. 
3 
fourth-century trinitarian doctrine of the Christian east, in the conceptual innovations 
of the so-called Cappadocian fathers: 
 
eine christliche-theologische Auseinandersetzung mit den Problemen des 
religiös-weltanschaulichen Pluralismus ihre Pointe verfehlen würde, wenn sie 
nicht daran erinnern ließe, daß in der Denkgeschichte des Christentums eine 
eigene Lösung des für den  Pluralismus grundlegenden Problems von Einheit 
und Vielfalt entwickelt worden und in der Trinitätslehre, vor allem den in der 
kappadozischen Tradition und verwandten Traditionen im Westen 
anzusiedelnden Konzeptionen, eine präzise begriffliche Formulierung 
gefunden hat. Sie hat ihren begrifflich genauen Ausdruck in der 
Unterscheidung und Beziehung von hypostasis und ousia gefunden und der 
damit behaupteten Gleichursprünglichkeit von Einheit und Vielheit in der 
Trinität.8  
  
The task before us is twofold: first, to set forth in brief outline the scriptural 
basis, early development, and creedal formulation of the doctrine of the trinity as the 
basis for contemporary Christian theological engagement with the characterisation of 
God in other faith traditions; and to do so, secondly, in view of the reconsideration of 
the grounds and ends of trinitarian theology in some representative Christian 
theologies of the modern west. In pursuit of this twofold agenda, we necessarily will 
find ourselves drawn us into the orbit of these recent attempts to trace the dynamics of 
Christian identity formation through cultural self-differentiation. In taking note of 
their central themes, major emphases, and characteristic idiom, however, must to 
exercise a twofold caution. First, we should not simply assume a theological 
understanding of the contemporary cultural and political situation of the Christian 
church will easily conform to analyses presumed in other forms of public discourse. 
Christian theology is not beholden to anthropology and sociology; where it does make 
use of the language of ‘identity formation’, ‘religious pluralism’ and so on, it does for 
                                                
8 Christoph Schwöbel, Christlicher Glaube im Pluralismus. Studien zu einer Theologie der Kultur 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), p. x; cf. Schwöbel, Gespräch, p. xix: ‘Mit ihrer Behauptung, daß 
Gott zugleich in der Dreiheit der trinitarischen Personen von Vater, Sohn, und Geist und in der Einheit 
des göttlichen Wesens ist, vertritt sie [viz., the Cappadocians] die These der Gleichursprünglichkeit 
von Einheit und Vielfalt für das Sein des trinitarischen Gottes, die sich darum in der radikalen 
Unterscheidung von Gottes schöpferischem Sein und dem geschöpflichen Sein von Welt und Mensch 
auch in Gottes Werken niederschlägt’. Recent patristic scholarship has shown a certain impatience with 
such systematic-theological recommendations of the trinitarian theology of the so-called Cappadocian 
Fathers, especially when it is portrayed in sharp contrast to a putatively monist conception of divine 
action in the western-Augustinian tradition. R. Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken. Bilanz, Kritik und 
Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu „De trinitate” (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), offers a 
clear review of the relevant literature with even-handed analysis.  
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its own reasons and on its own terms.9 Second, we must beware allowing an interest 
in the communicative pragmatics of Christian confession to obscure the simple fact 
that on its own terms the church’s confession is not principally an act of communal 
poesis but an act of acknowledgment, one evoked by God’s disclosure of his identity 
and his will for creation.  
Explication of this latter insight entails both a negation and an affirmation. On 
the one hand, in its confession, the Christian church acknowledges that God is not 
known otherwise than in his free self-disclosure (God lives beyond coercion and 
discovery, never unwillingly or unwittingly known as the one he is). This negation, 
however, follows from a prior affirmation: God graciously has made himself known 
as the one he is. ‘The Lord our God has shown us his glory and greatness’ (Deut. 
5.24); ‘No one has ever seen God. It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father’s 
heart, who has made him known’ (John 1.18). The church’s acknowledgement of God 
and his works thus finds its ultimate basis and norm in divine revelation.10 
In the church’s deference to God’s self-presentation, a special place is 
accorded to the faithful reading of the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, 
which are understood at once as a unique documentary issue and instrument of divine 
revelation and as the prime textual motive of the church’s confession. In this respect, 
Christian theology may be characterised simply as a matter of ‘being formed and 
forming others by Holy Scripture’.11 And the presiding question in the Christian 
doctrine of God may be specified as the conformity of the church’s confession of God 
to the reality of God in his self-presentation, a question which continually is put to the 
church by scripture in fulfilment of its divinely ordered role as ‘canon’.  
                                                
9 Schwöbel speaks of the need ‘die Situation des Pluralismus selbst theologisch zu verstehen’ 
(Pluralismus, p. xii).  
10 Hilary, De Trinitate 5.21 (PL 10, 143A): ‘A Deo discendum est, quid de Deo intelligendum sit: quia 
non nisi se auctore cognoscitur.’ Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, trans. G.W. 
Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), p. 189: ‘If the knowledge of God be understood in such a 
way that in our own strength we can wrest from deity the secret of its nature, deity is lacking from the 
very outset. This kind of knowledge would not be knowledge of God, for it would contradict the 
concept of God. Hence the knowledge of God is possible only by revelation.’ The theological utility of 
Panneberg’s formulation turns on a frank admission of its circularity: If the ‘concept of God’ is not 
itself a deliverance of revelation, it cannot form the basis for an argument that all human knowledge of 
God rests on revelation. 
11 Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 28.1 (see J. Barbel, ed. Gregor von Nazianz. Die fünf theologischen 
Reden. Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1963, p. 62): th|~ grafh|~ tupwqe/ntej te kai\ tupw&santej. 
5 
According to the testimony of Israel’s prophets, God freely wills to be, and 
wills to be known as, the creator of all things and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob. ‘I am the Lord your God … I who stretch out the heavens, who laid the 
foundations of the earth, and who say to Zion, “You are my people”’ (Isa. 51.15–16).  
Israel’s confession of its God therefore involves recognition both of God’s gracious 
faithfulness to his chosen, wayward people and of his loving rule of all creatures, 
which in their own manner also are called to glad acknowledgement of their creator 
and also are implicated in Israel’s destiny.12  
Precisely in creation and in the election of Israel—in identifying himself as the 
unrivalled origin and governor of all things and as the Lord of his covenant people—
God distinguishes himself from any and all creatures and also from all manufactured 
gods, manifesting himself to Israel as the uniquely glorious and gracious Lord, 
beyond all creaturely comparison or classification. ‘I have made, and I will bear; I will 
carry and will save. To whom will you liken me and make me equal?’ (Isa. 46.4–5). 
The relationship between God and Israel is not less than fully rational: ‘Come now, let 
us reason together, says the Lord’ (Isa. 1.18); but here created reason is called to 
acknowledge a difference beyond its containment: ‘as the heavens are higher than the 
earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts’ 
(Isa. 55.9). Israel knew its sinfulness as an inhibition of its knowledge of God (cf. Jer. 
4.22; Hosea 4.1–6); but the incomprehensibility of God is not coincident with human 
sinfulness. Already as the creator, God exceeds all created vision and comprehension; 
even the most exalted heavenly creature is denied direct sight of God (cf. Isa. 6.2).13  
In the New Testament, this twofold divine self-manifestation and self-
distinction assumes explicitly christological and trinitarian dimensions. The one, true 
God, the creator of all things and Israel’s Lord, now manifests himself by the Spirit as 
                                                
12 See Psalm 136, 145, 148 et multa alia.  
13 This holds whether one understands the seraphim depicted in this passage to be covering their own 
faces or (as in the exegetical tradition represented in Origen, De Principiis IV 3,14) the face of God.  
Among many patristic formulations of the theological principle, see Gregory of Nyssa, Contra 
Eunomium 2.69: ‘The barrier which separates uncreated nature from created being is great and 
impenetrable’ (polu_ ga_r to_ me/son kai\ a)dieci/thton, w|{ pro_j th_n ktisth_n ou)si/an h( a1ktistoj 
fu&sij diatetei/xistai) (in the translation of S.G. Hall (see L. Kafíková, S. Douglass, and J. 
Zachhuber, eds, Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II. An English Version with Supporting Studies 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), p. 74)). 
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the Father of Jesus Christ, the eternal Son through whom and for whom all things are 
created  (cf. Col. 1.15–20; Eph. 1. Heb. 1.1–2). Accordingly, the relationship between 
God and the world inaugurated in creation and upheld in Israel’s election henceforth is 
to be proclaimed and acknowledged in all creation with reference to the relation 
between the Father and the Son realised and recognised in the Spirit. Here appears a 
‘new self-identification of God in history’, one that ‘does not annul his earlier self-
identification as the God of Israel, but which opens a new chapter in the history of 
God with humanity’.14  
In complex continuity with the faith of canonical Israel, then, we see in the 
texts of the New Testament the early Christian church confessing the Father of Jesus 
Christ as the one creator of all and as the one Lord of the covenant. And we observe it 
doing so through scripturally disciplined patterns of speech—in acclamation, 
invocation, and proclamation—marked at once both by strict regard for the 
infrangible distinction between the uncreated creator and the creature and by an 
equally strict commitment to the trinitarian shape of God’s enacted faithfulness to his 
covenant with Israel, now opened to all those, both Jew and Gentile, who by the Spirit 
have been united in faith with the Father’s unique Son.  
Here we encounter the particular freedom and pathos of Christian confession 
of God: On the one hand, the church that exists in praise and service of the God of the 
gospel is liberated from merely local religious affiliation or political allegiance. 
Finding itself directed by its crucified, risen, living Lord to bear and be borne by the 
gospel into the whole world, it is a properly ‘apostolic’ and ‘catholic’ community—a 
people sent with an announcement of universal significance, drawn into the freedom 
of the Spirit’s movement in the world. But the church that is segregated by God to this 
particular service, finding itself united precisely in its singular confession of one God 
as wholly free creator and as wholly faithful redeemer—the church that confesses 
itself to be ‘one’ and ‘holy’—suffers with and in the world which finds the gospel an 
perpetual offense. 
 
The early development of the Christian doctrine of God 
                                                
14 C. Schwöbel, ‘Trinitätslehre’, p. 412.  
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The church’s early mission to the Jews and to the Gentiles is, theologically 
conceived, at once a profound spiritual mystery and a matter of quite considerable 
historiographical delicacy. Reduced to its simplest outline, and refracted through the 
scriptural themes we have traced thus far, the church’s earliest movements may be 
told as its continual confrontation with a twofold temptation: on the one hand, to 
obscure the proper distinction-in-relation of the creator and creature; and, on the other 
hand, to admit a flattening of or rupture in the history of God’s dealings with his 
people. The ways in which these two basic temptations shaped early Christian 
confession, the processes by which they were identified as temptations and resisted, 
and the extent to which they were overcome, require expansive narration and resist 
simple distillation. The church, of course, never encountered either temptation in 
isolation; in some measure, every moment of Christian witness was an occasion both 
to confess the absolute freedom of the creator and his astonishing faithfulness to 
creation. In concrete scriptural terms: ‘the apostles gave their testimony to the 
resurrection of the Lord Jesus’ (Acts 4.33). But its early encounters with the cultures 
of Mediterranean antiquity, the apostolic church found itself confessing the triune 
God by speaking of the resurrection now with this emphasis and now with that, now 
with particular insistence on the immeasurable power at work in this event and now 
with concern especially for the depth of the divine wisdom that shines forth in it, now 
under the aspect of freedom and now of faithfulness  
Thus, confronting a first great threat to the church’s unified confession, the 
apostles took up with special urgency the question of the proper continuity of God’s 
saving action in face of the unanticipated working of the Spirit among the Gentiles. 
The issue is not wholly resolved in the New Testament, but two limit conditions are 
identified. On the one hand, in face of a so-called Judaising trajectory, the church 
must not fail to acknowledge the genuine novelty of God’s work in Jesus Christ 
attested by the Spirit of Pentecost (cf. Acts 15); on the other, against any form of 
spiritual forgetfulness, it must not conceive of this novelty as sheer displacement of 
God’s earlier works—the Gentile church must understand itself, precisely as the 
adopted children of God, as taken up into the embracing history of God’s dealings 
8 
with Israel (cf. Rom. 9–11).15 In the later second century, in the formative diagnosis 
of Irenaeus, we find these two limiting possibilities named heresies, to be rejected by 
the catholic church under the names Ebionitism and Marcionism.  
Again, in a second threat to the church’s confession, we see already in the 
New Testament the possibility that the God of the gospel may be understood, not as 
the free creator of all things, but as in some manner a restricted god. This restriction 
may be understood variously: God may be conceived as a needful deity, one who 
requires material provision and human service; conversely, God may be understood as 
one to whom materiality is repellant and for whom direct involvement with embodied 
human existence is unthinkable. And we see in the apostolic gospel a continual 
insistence at once upon the radical transcendence of God, the one who lives from 
himself, beyond need, beyond creaturely conditioning, the one who has life and gives 
it (cf. Acts 17.24–5), and upon his presence in his own creation in the incarnation of 
the Son and the outpouring of the Spirit to restore and to perfect the world fallen from 
its original goodness.16 In Irenaeus, we find this apostolic tradition maintained 
especially against the cosmological dualism and complex theology of mediation 
developed amongst the Valentinians.17 For Irenaeus, God the Father of Jesus Christ is 
not other than the sole creator of heaven and earth; the Father’s claim upon creation 
enacted and announced in the incarnation of Jesus Christ is original, immediate, and 
comprehensive; the goodness that properly is a predicate of God alone derivatively is 
a predicate of creation in all its aspects, both spiritual and material; and in Jesus 
Christ this goodness is graciously reaffirmed and restored to all creatures.18 More 
closely, the human creature, ‘a mixture of soul and flesh’, is not brought into being by 
                                                
15 The mode of apostolic reasoning about the significance of incarnation and pentecost—the pervasive 
sense that these events must be depicted and understood precisely through immediate and intensive 
engagement with Israel’s scriptures—itself is as telling as any discrete apostolic affirmation of God’s 
abiding interest in Israel.  
16 In formal regulative terms: When speaking of the divine transcendence, Christian theology must 
‘avoid both a simple univocal attribution of predicates to God and the world and a simple contrast of 
divine and non-divine predicates’; when speaking of God’s creative agency, it must ‘avoid … all 
suggestion of limitation in scope or manner’ (K. Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology. 
Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p. 47). 
17 On the need to develop a ‘non-Irenaean paradigm for understanding the second-century’ which 
resists the widespread habit of speaking of Irenaus’ opponents (the disciples of Marcion, Valentinus, 
and so on) generically as ‘gnostics’, see David Brakke, ‘Self-differentiation among Christian groups: 
the Gnostics and their opponents’ (Cambridge History of Christianity I:245–60; the quotation is from 
p. 246)). 
18 M.C. Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of Redemption (Boston: 
Brill, 2008), p. 73.  
9 
a demiurge or by angelic agency but is formed and molded in the image of God by 
God the Son and God the Spirit, the ‘two hands’ of God the Father.19 The whole 
human creature, in both its spiritual and physical determinants, is the object of the one 
God’s creative intention; this intention is enacted by the Son and the Spirit, who thus 
have an original share in the uniquely divine activity of creation. It follows that the 
salvation of humanity in Jesus Christ entails the restoration and perfection of the 
flesh, not an escape from it; and that the Son and Spirit act with nothing less than 
divine authority in their saving work. 
We see, then, in Irenaeus’ work, a properly trinitarian vision of God’s unified 
creative and redemptive activity—one that to a remarkable degree anticipates some of 
the central affirmations of fourth-century Nicene Christianity. In a recent distillation:  
 
the creation and the salvation of human beings are the work of God insofar as 
he is Trinity. The divine action is one, and its modality is essentially 
Trinitarian. The same God the Trinity who leads humans to the fulfillment of 
their vocation is the God who created them. And God creates like he saves, 
that is to say, in a Trinitarian manner: the Father creates and saves through his 
Son and Spirit.20 
 
Ingredient in this understanding of the trinitarian nature of the whole course of 
God’s dealings with creation—the entire divine ‘economy’—lies an affirmation with 
implications for a question about the status of the distinctions between Father, Son, 
and Spirit that deeply exercised Christian thought in the second and third centuries: 
Do the names ‘Father’, ‘Son’, and ‘Spirit’ simply refer to sequential presentational 
‘modes’ in which the one God, who in himself is without any real distinction, 
manifests himself in the world? Or is the relation between Father and Son (to focus on 
the relation on which the debate most often was concentrated) real also in God? 
Committed to retaining the axiomatic unity of God, third-century ‘modalists’ affirmed 
the former. In response, Tertullian proposed the church speak of God as ‘trinity’ and 
                                                
19 See Against Heresies 3.21.10; 4.pref.4; 4.20.1. On the ‘two hands’ language in Irenaeus’ theology, 
see the cautionary remarks of A. Briggman, Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit 
(Oxford: OUP, 2012), who draws attention to a misplaced tendency in some recent work to ‘conside[r] 
the identification of the Son and the Spirit as Hands to hold the principal place in Irenaeus’ conception 
of the Trinitarian relations and to be his principal expression of the immanence of God to creation’ (p. 
114 n. 41). 
20 Gilles Emery, The Trinity. An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God, trans. M. 
Levering (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), pp. 169–70.  
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to recognise in its talk of God a systematic distinction between the three divine 
personae (the Father, Son, and Spirit) and the unitary divine substantia. This 
distinction was intended to secure both the primal Christian commitment to the 
oneness of God and the authenticity of his self-revelation in time. For, as Tertullian 
rightly saw, the truthfulness of the biblical attestation of God is at issue. In modalist 
theology, a gap is opened between the Father, Son, and Spirit whose creative and 
saving activity scripture depicts and the ‘real’ God who lies behind these 
manifestations. Thus ‘the whole biblical talk of God is deprived of reference to God. 
None of the three is God’.21      
In attempting to grasp the full significance of the characterisation of God in 
the ‘divine scriptures’,22 Origen of Alexandria—a figure of remarkable exegetical 
penetration and rare speculative power—found himself required to affirm both the 
Father’s unique prerogative to be called God in the true sense of the term and to insist 
upon the divinity of the logos that was, according to his reading of John 1:3, with God 
‘in the beginning’.23 Origen himself, it seems, did not reconcile what later came to be 
perceived as a tendency towards subordinationism (finding expression in the 
distinction between the Father, who is ‘true God’, and the Son, who is divine but not 
‘true God’) with his conviction that the Father never is the Father without the Son 
(finding expression in his doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. Just so, he 
bequeathed to the church a problematic whose resolution was central to the great 
theological debates of the fourth century.24 At the beginning of these contestations, 
we find in Arius of Alexandria an exploitation of the conceptual distinction between 
‘divinity’ and the ‘true God’ and a rejection of the doctrine of eternal generation. For 
                                                
21 Robert Jenson, ‘The Triune God’, in C.E. Braaten and R.W. Jenson, eds, Christian Dogmatics, vol. 1 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), p. 119.  
22 Cf. De principiis , 4.1.1.  
23 Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 2.2.16: Alhqino_j ou}n qeo_j o( qeo&j, oi9 de\ kat' e0kei=non 
morfou&menoi qeoi\ w(j ei0ko&nej prwtotu&pou: a)lla_ pa&lin tw~n pleio&nwn ei0ko&nwn h( a)rxe/tupoj 
ei0kw_n o( pro_j to_n qeo&n e0sti lo&goj, o4j «e0n a)rxh|~» h}n, tw|~ ei]nai «pro_j to_n qeo_n» a)ei\ me/nwn 
«qeo&j», ou)k a2n d' au)to_ e0sxhkw_j ei0 mh_ pro_j qeo_n h}n [i.e., the logos is not au)to&qeoj], kai\ ou)k 
a2n mei/naj qeo&j, ei0 mh_ pare/mene th|~ a)dialei/ptw| qe/a| tou~ patrikou~ba&qouj.  
24 On these fourth-century controversies, see Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to 
Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Christopher A. Beeley, 
Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See 
Light (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); J. Warren Smith, ‘The Trinity in the Fourth-Century 
Fathers’, in G. Emery and M. Levering, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 109–21. 
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Arius, the Son is freely begotten by the unconstrained will of the unbegotten Father to 
serve as a created mediator between the uncreated creator and the rest of creation; the 
Son thus precedes all other creatures but does not exist eternally with the Father: 
‘there was when he was not’. In Athanasius of Alexandria we encounter an 
appropriation of Origen’s doctrine of eternal generation with a corresponding 
rejection of any concept of ‘graded’ deity. The line between the eternal creator and the 
creature is absolute; if the Son is eternally with the Father he is equal in divinity with 
the Father and so one with the Father according to his divine nature (homoousios).25 
It is not insignificant that these doctrinal debates unfolded just as the churches 
on both sides of this debate faced a dramatic transformation in the political landscape. 
In the first decade of the fourth century, Christians were enduring active persecution 
under Diocletian; twenty years later, under Constantine, they enjoyed imperial 
patronage and oversight. Constantine saw in Christianity a force for the social 
cohesion of his empire, and recognised the political consequences of sustained 
doctrinal division between the churches. At his behest, then, a council of bishops from 
east and west gathered in Nicaea in 325 to resolve, inter alia, the dispute between 
Arius and Athanasius, and the assembled bishops repudiated Arius’ teaching, 
endorsing the Athanasian homooousios and speaking of the eternally begotten Son as 
‘true God from true God’.26 
The Nicene definition of the faith provoked ongoing controversy throughout 
the fourth century. Its use of the (nonscriptural) word homoousios proved 
controversial: talk of the divine ousia was easily misconstrued in materialist terms to 
suggest that the generation of the Son involved a division of the Father’s substance. 
Further, the homoousios seemed to the Eusebians and their allies to elide the proper 
distinction of Father and Son, and some of its most prominent advocates (including 
Marcellus of Ancyra) were suspected, not without reason, of tending towards 
modalism. On the other hand, in the view of the ‘orthodox’ churches, Arius’ 
                                                
25 See, e.g., Oratio I contra Arianos, 39.4–5( K. Metzler and K. Savvidis, Athanasius: Werke, Band I. 
Die dogmatischen Schriften, Erster Teil, 2.Lieferung (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1998)): mo&noj 
au)to_j a)lhqino_j ui9o_j kai\ mo&noj «e0k tou~ a)lhqinou~ qeou~ qeo_j a)lhqino&j» e0stin, ou) misqo_n a)reth~j 
tau~ta labw_n ou)de\ a1lloj w2n para_ tau~ta, a)lla_ fu&sei kat' ou)si/an w2n tau~ta. ge/nnhma ga_r 
th~j tou~ patro_j ou)si/aj u(pa&rxei, w3ste mhde\ a)mfiba&llein o3ti kaq' o(moio&thta tou~ a)tre/ptou 
patro_j a1trepto&j e0sti kai\ o( lo&goj. 
26 See Norman P. Tanner, S.J., ed, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. Volume One: Nicaea I to 
Lateran V (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), p. 5: Qeo\n a0lhqino\n e0k qeou= a0lhqinou=.  
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subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father undercut the legitimacy of received 
Christian practices of devotion to Christ, and it left claims regarding the work of the 
Son in effecting human salvation without a basis in being. If Christ is not true God, he 
cannot perform the works that God alone performs; if Christ is a creature among other 
creatures, he cannot properly be the object of the church’s worship.27 
We cannot here review in any detail the complex disputes that led to the 
vindication and elaboration of the Nicene faith at the Council of Constantinople (381). 
In broad outline, the period from the 350s saw a consolidation of doctrinal and 
political postures towards the Nicene formula. A broad confederacy of ‘pro-Nicenes’ 
came to believe acceptance of its definition an important marker of catholic Christian 
identity. They were regarded as innovators by those retaining a more conservative 
biblicist style of belief, who found themselves united in a conviction that Christian 
theology flourishes where it exhibits direct deference to scripture without (the 
nonscriptural) language of the divine ousia. These ‘homoians’ rejected the Nicene 
homouousios whilst claiming that Son is like (homoios) the Father in all things not 
according to ousia but simply ‘as the Holy Scriptures say and teach’. A recourse to 
ousia language marked a stronger form of subordinationist, anti-Nicene Christianity: 
from the late 350s, Aetius and his disciple Eunomius began to teach that the Son was 
unlike the Father according to essence.28 Eunomian theology can be understood as the 
product of a particular philosophy of language brought to bear in a theology marked 
by a primal and controlling commitment to the ‘unbegottenness’ (agennesia) of the 
divine nature. Eunomius’ argument: Names reveal the essence of a thing; God’s 
essence may be fully comprehended under the name ‘Unbegotten’ (agennetos); the 
Son is begotten (gennetos); the Son thus is, per definitionem, not homoousios with the 
Father. In other words: the divine essence, qua unbegotten, cannot be communicated; 
thus the generation of the Son by the Father cannot yield a communication and 
continuity of essence between them. Rather, the notion of generation marks an 
essential difference between the Father and Son.  
                                                
27 See, e.g., Athanasius, Contra Arianos 2.22–4.   
28 Beeley, Nazianzus, p. 21, notes that while the group that coalesced around the teaching of Aetius and 
Eunomius came to be called ‘Anomoian’, that title is misleading; their claim was not that the Son was 
unlike the Father in all respects but strictly kat’ ousian, so that they are more aptly called ‘heterousians’.  
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Eunomius’ proposals provoked widespread reaction; and the responses of the 
so-called Cappadocian Fathers—Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory 
Nazianzus—proved crucial for the continuing course of Nicene orthodoxy. These 
three figures did not always speak with one voice; the tactical and material differences 
between them should not be underestimated.29 But in their responses to Eunomian 
theology they developed and exhibited a set of shared doctrinal priorities and 
strategies that were widely shared in the trinitarian culture of the fourth century in 
both the east and west, and which continue to shape Christian thought and speech 
about God.  
 
The language of trinitarian confession  
 
‘True faith’, Bonaventure says, ‘bids us believe that, in the one nature, there are three 
persons [in unitate naturae sunt tres personae]: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’. The 
Father is uniquely unoriginate or innascible; the Son originates from the Father alone 
through generation; the Spirit originates from the Father and the Son through spiration 
or procession. And yet this irreducible plurality of persons ‘does not exclude from the 
divine essence a supreme unity, simplicity, immensity, eternity, immutability, 
necessity, or even primacy; more, it includes supreme fecundity, love, generosity, 
equality, kinship, likeness, and inseparability’.30 In Bonaventure’s presentation of the 
sound understanding [intelligentia sana] of the true faith [recta fides] secundum 
sanctorum Doctorum documenta we may see the legacy of the patristic insight that in 
face of the divine mystery the church is led to speak of God under a twofold aspect, 
employing both substantial names and relative names. Christian confession of the 
Trinity involves two modes of predication: by way of substance and by way of 
relation.31  
                                                
29 See, e.g., Christoph Markschies, ‘Gibt es eine einheitliche »kappadozische Trinitätstheologie«? 
Vorläufige Erwägungen zu Einheit und Differenzen neunizänischer Theologie’, in Alta Trinità Beata 
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2000), pp. 196–237.  
30 Bonaventure, Breviloquium 1.2 (Opera Omnia (Quarrachi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1891), V:210; 
ET The Breviloquium, trans. J. de Vinck (Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1963), p. 35).  
31 Breviloquium 1.4 (Opera Omnia V:212; ET p. 41): ‘in divinis sunt duo modi praedicandi, scilicet per 
modum substantiae et relationis’. In the background lies the categorial scheme of Aristotle, Categories 
1b25–2a4.  
14 
 Substantial names denote what is common to the Father, Son, and Spirit—
their one power, operation, nature, glory; relative names refer to the distinctive 
properties of the three. And it is ‘from the combination of both, that is, of the common 
and unique, we arrive at comprehension of the truth’.32 For Gregory Nazianzus, ‘the 
three are a single whole in their Godhead and the single whole is three in personalities 
[idiotes]’33, so that he can enjoin his hearers:   
when I speak of God, let yourselves be surrounded with a flash of that light 
which is both one and three: three in properties, or indeed in hypostases, if one 
wants to call them that, or indeed in ‘persons’—for we will not become 
involved in a battle over names, as long as the syllables point towards the 
same notion—and one with regard to the concept of substance, or indeed 
divinity.34 
 
 In contemporary theological parlance, Basil and Gregory here are 
recommending and exhibiting a ‘reduplication’ (redoublement) in Christian language 
about God.35 In Gilles Emery’s terms, ‘in order to speak the Trinitarian mystery, it is 
necessary always to employ two words, two formulas, in a reflection in two modes 
that joins here the substantial (essential) aspect and the distinction of persons (relative 
properties)’.36       
The first mode of signification takes regard for the unity of the divine essence 
and will, in conformity to the rule that ‘terms predicated as substances of all three 
persons are predicated severally and jointly, and in the singular’.37 Everything said of 
God essentially—every designation of what God is—is to be said equally and simply 
of the three persons: each is all that the one God is; each is fully God with the others 
who themselves are fully God; accordingly each acts with undiminished, undivided 
divine power commonly and inseparably with the others. God the Father is light; God 
                                                
32 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius 2.28 (ET St. Basil of Caesarea: Against Eunomius, trans. Mark 
Delcogliano and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America, 
2011), p. 174). 
33 Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 31.9. 
34 Oration 39.11 (ET Brian E. Daley, S.J., Gregory of Nazianzus (London and New York: Routledge, 
2006), p. 132). Cf. Oration 38.7–8; John of Damascus, An Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, 1.10. 
35 Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics. Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 214–6.  
36 Emery, Trinitarian Theology, p. 46. Lewis Ayres draws attention to a different form of this 
reduplication of trinitarian language in Augustine (Augustine and the Trinity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. 260–1). 
37 Bonaventure, Breviloquium 1.4.2 (Opera Omnia V:212–13; ET p. 43–4). 
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the Son is light; God the Holy Spirit is light; the one God is one light—one not by 
addition or abstraction but in the highest simplicity.  
 The second way of speaking has reference to irreducible threefoldness of 
God—to the distinctive properties of the ‘persons’ or ‘modes  of being’ that exist in 
God and constitute the divine life. And here the basic rule is that one must not 
conflate the persons either with the one divine essence or with the other persons. God 
the Father is God, God the Son is God, and God the Spirit is God. But the Father is 
not the Son; and the Spirit is neither Father nor Son. If we ask what distinguishes the 
Father from the Son and the Spirit from both, the answer is: they are distinguished by 
their relations to one another. More specifically, they are distinguished by relations of 
origin. The Father is from no one; the Son is from the Father; the Spirit is from the 
Father (and the Son). Put otherwise: the Father is unbegotten; the Father generates the 
Son, so that the Son is begotten by the Father; and the Father spirates the Spirit, so 
that the Spirit proceeds from the Father (and the Son). But the names Father, Son, and 
Spirit name relations that exist ‘within’ the one Godhead; so to acknowledge that the 
Son is not the Father, that as the begotten one he is not unbegotten, does not introduce 
an essential distinction between them.38  
This reduplicative pattern of theological speech is informed by the doctrine of 
divine simplicity, which affirms that the God whom scripture designates by his 
several names is wholly at one with himself in himself and in all his relations to 
creation. There are no ‘parts’ in God; no friction or fissure within the divine life. God 
is not a composite being but the one who eternally lives from himself in perfect self-
sufficiency and self-consistency, also in his relations with creation. The three divine 
‘persons’ thus do not compose the divine essence, nor do they hover above that 
                                                
38 Alternatively, with Gregory Nazianzus, one could say that the generation of the Son and the 
procession of the Spirit from the Father simply is the unity of the one Godhead. See Oration 42.15: 
‘The name of the One without beginning is “Father”, of the Beginning “Son”, of the One with the 
Beginning “Holy Spirit”. There is one nature for all three: God. The unity [among them] is the Father, 
from whom and towards whom everything else is referred, not so as to be mixed together in confusion, 
but so as to be contained, without time or will or power intervening to divide them. These three have 
caused us to exist in multiplicity, each of us being in constant tension with ourselves and with 
everything else. But for them, whose nature is simple and whose existence is the same, the principal 
characteristic is unity.’ Cf. Beeley, Nazianzus, pp. 204–12 (commenting on Or. 25): The relationship of 
the three subsistent modes of God’s being is preserved as a unity because of the Father’s monarchy. 
The ‘dance’ of perichoresis is, then, not the mutual participation of each person in the other but the Son 
and the Spirit’s movement in and out of the Father who is ‘in’ and ‘with’ them because his divinity is 
in them. In this way Beeley rejects John Meyendorff’s characterization of Greek theology as 
emphasizing the principle of personhood over the single divine essence; the Father, as unbegotten 
divinity, is the starting point of Gregory’s theology.  
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essence. Each is, with the others, the one God. Again, scripture speaks of God as 
good, just, holy, and so on; but the divine life is not an aggregation of discrete 
(mutually complementary or perhaps detractory) divine ‘attributes’. The scriptural 
names of God cannot be understood as a license to speak of God as attaining his unity 
through a process cumulative or conflictual. Nor, again, are these scriptural 
designations of God merely factitious, applied to a divine reality which in its proper 
essence is void of all distinction and agency. The God revealed in scripture is not a 
projection of religiously creative or of philosophically abstractive thought. God is the 
uncontained, self-giving term of theological intellection and denomination.39 At 
perfect peace and rest in the richness of his fully actualised life, he reaches out to 
human creatures, immediately involving himself in their situation, drawing them to 
himself—not in actualisation or fulfilment or resolution of his own life but from a 
fullness of light and love beyond the reciprocities of creaturely life. And so he makes 
himself known as the incomparable creator of all things by taking to himself 
creaturely names, none of which is fully sufficient to the simple abundance of his 
divine life but all of which together form a pathway into the knowledge of God 
befitting human creatures. And so it is that Deus, cum sit simplex, tamen multipliciter 
dicitur.40  
 This common commitment—not always expressed in regulative or 
‘grammatical’ terms but more or less explicitly and consistently maintained in 
opposition to tendencies to conflate the essential and relational—to a reduplicative 
confession of the triune God may be traced from the fourth-century trinitarian bishops 
of the Greek and Latin churches through the theologies of the medieval and early 
modern west.41 And while the political, social, and intellectual transformations 
leading to and attending the sixteenth-century reformation placed enormous strain on 
the culture of biblical reading and theological argument that nourished classical 
                                                
39 Cf. Hilary of Poitiers, De trinitate, 2.6; Gregory Nazianzus, Oration 38.7–8.  
40 Peter Lombard, I Sent. d.8, cap. 5. This sketch of the function of the doctrine of divine simplicity 
holds whether one adopts a version of the ‘identity thesis’, according to which God’s substance is 
identical with his attributes (cf. the formulation of the Council of Florence: omniaque sunt unum, ubi 
non obviat relationis oppositio (Tanner, Decrees, p. 571)), or conceives of the divine attributes as 
propria of the divine nature (see Andrew Rade-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the 
Transformation of Divine Simplicity (Oxford: OUP, 2009)).  
41 Further on the trinitarian ‘grammar’ of medieval and reformational theology, G. Emery, The 
Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. F.A. Murphy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 44–8; B. Ellis, Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), pp. 67–8. 
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trinitarian theology, the characterisation of God in the confessions of faith of the 
Protestant churches often closely resembled the conciliar formulations of the high 
middle ages. To take only one example: the language of Lateran IV (1215)—‘unus 
solus est verus Deus, aeternus, immensus et incommutabilis, incomprehensibilis, 
omnipotens et ineffabilis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus: tres quidem personae, sed 
una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino’42—finds an echo in the resolutely 
Calvinist Scots Confession of 1560, according to which God is ‘eternal, infinite, 
immeasurable, incomprehensible, omnipotent, invisible; one in substance and yet 
distinct in three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost’.43 The presenting 
issue in the conflict between the magisterial reformers and the Roman Catholic 
church, we might say, was not the formal identification of the one true God so much 
as the nature of true religion. The challenge to the classical doctrine of the Trinity 
came from other directions: from the sixteenth-century Unitarian and anti-Trinitarian 
pamphleteers; Enlightenment political philosophy and biblical scholarship; and—
decisively for the continuing course of trinitarian theology in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries—the critical and speculative idealist systems of Kant and Hegel.  
 
Religion and confession in emerging modernity 
 
The material continuity and the decisive shift of emphasis in the early reformational 
confession of God is visible in Luther’s gloss on the first article of the creed: ‘Erstlich 
glaube ich von Herzen den hohen Artikel der göttlichen Majestät, daß Vater, Sohn, 
heiliger Geist drei unterschiedliche Personen, ein rechter, einziger, natürlicher, 
wahrhaftiger Gott ist: Schöpfer Himmels und der Erden, wie das alles bisher sowohl 
in der römischen Kirche und in aller Welt bei den christlichen Kirchen gehalten ist.’44 
Luther does not introduce a new object of Christian confession; God is known and 
named here in concert with the whole church as the triune creator of all things. But 
the tonal quality of the confession changes: glaube ich von Herzen. In Luther we 
                                                
42 H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum (Barcelona: Herder, 1948), §428.  
43 G.D. Henderson, ed., The Scots Confession: 1560 (Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press, 1960).  
44 Martin Luther, ‘Bekenntnis der Artikel des Glaubens wider die Feinde des Evangeliums und allerlei 
Ketzereien (Vom Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis) 1528’, in Luther Deutsch: die Werke Martin Luthers 
in neuer Auswahl für die Gegenwart, 4th ed., ed. K. Aland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 
1990), p. 309 (WA 26, 499). 
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encounter a new and distinctive interest in faith’s confession as an act of religious 
subjectivity; a primary characterisation of faith as the hearing of the word of the 
gospel of Jesus Christ; and a relentless emphasis on the distinction between faith’s 
reception of the gift of grace and all legal-moral calculation.45  
The truth of the gospel is this, that our righteousness comes by faith alone, without 
the works of the law. … Human reason has the law as its object. It says to itself: “This 
I have done; this I have not done.” But faith in its proper function has no other object 
than Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was put to death for the sins of the world.46 
In Luther’s analysis of the dynamics of faith and reason, we find a second 
novelty—a new critique and so a new objectification of ‘religion’.47 The distinction 
between ‘true’ Christian religion and all other forms of human religious activity is 
drawn out in two interrelated ways. On the one hand, doctrine of justification by grace 
through faith alone is characterised as the central point of Christian teaching and as 
the differentiating feature of true religion—the place of significant Christian variation 
from the common human tendency, variously expressed, towards self-justification on 
the basis of meritorious religious practices.  
[A]lthough some do works that are more splendid, great, and difficult than the others, 
the content remains the same, and only the quality is different. That is, the works vary 
only in appearance and in name. For they are still works. And those who do them are 
not Christians; they are hirelings, whether they are called Jews, Mohammedans, 
papists, or sectarians.48 
 This diagnosis finds an exact correspondence in the distinctive Christian 
insistence upon identifying and approaching God as Father solely with reference to 
                                                
45See B.A. Gerrish, ‘Doctor: Doctor Martin Luther: Subjectivity and Doctrine in the Lutheran 
Reformation’, in P.N. Brooks, ed., Seven-Headed Luther. Essays in Commemoration of a 
Quincentenary 1483–1983 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), pp. 1–24 [18–19]: ‘In Luther’s theological 
reflection the religious subject does turn back upon itself; it makes its believing the object of thought. 
By the very fact of singling out justification by faith as his “chief article”, Luther fostered a change of 
theological priorities and theological style in comparison with medieval Scholasticism. … Assertions 
about God and man in this theology are made strictly as answers to questions about sin and 
justification; the object of Christian teaching is the life of faith itself, viewed from the inside. And in 
this respect there is genuine continuity between the Reformation and liberal Protestantism.’ 
46 Martin Luther, Lectures on Galatians 1535, ed. J. Pelikan (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1963), p. 88; cf. 
pp. 113–14.  
47 On the relation of the nascent interest in religious subjectivity, the reformational critique of the 
medieval cultus, and the emergence of ‘religion’ as an object of detached analysis, see J. Samuel Preus, 
‘Zwingli, Calvin and the Origin of Religion’, in Church History 46:2 (1977), pp. 186–202.   
48 Luther, Galatians, p. 10.  
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and in his unique Son Jesus Christ, the sole mediator between God and human 
creatures.  
[I]t is a rule and principle in the scriptures, and one that must be scrupulously 
observed, to refrain from speculation about the majesty of God, which is too much for 
the human body, and especially for the human mind to bear. “Man shall not see me 
and live,” says scripture (Ex. 33.20). The pope, the Turks, the Jews, and the sectarians 
pay no attention to this rule. They put Christ the mediator out of their sight, speak 
only of God, pray only to him, and act only in relation to him. … But true Christian 
theology … does not present God to us in his majesty, as Moses and other teachings 
do, but Christ born of the virgin as our mediator and high priest. … For as in own 
nature God is immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, so to man’s nature he is 
intolerable. Therefore whenever you consider the doctrine of justification and wonder 
how or where or in what condition to find a God who justifies or accepts sinners, then 
you must know that there is no other God than this man Jesus Christ. Take hold of 
him; cling to him with all your heart, and spurn all speculation about the divine 
majesty.49  
For Luther, this anti-speculative, christologically focused conception of 
Christian doctrine was directly linked to a robustly trinitarian identification of God: 
Christ is not merely a perfect creature—a teaching that Luther ascribes to the Arians 
and then, following an influential trajectory of Christian analogical reasoning, to 
Muslim theology—but true God, who performs acts that can be ascribed only to the 
creator. ‘For he grants grace and peace; and to give these is to condemn sin, to 
conquer death, and to trample the devil underfoot. No angel can grant any of this; but 
since it is ascribed to Christ, it necessarily follows that he is God by nature.’50 
In thus rejecting the medieval articulation of the Augustinian doctrine of grace 
(fides caritate formata)51 and reconfiguring it within a theological framework strictly 
ordered to the scriptural attestation of the death of Jesus Christ (theologia crucis), 
Luther opened a new chapter in the western theological tradition. In doing so, he 
presumed the abiding significance of the received tradition of western trinitarian 
theology, with its recurring anti-dualist emphasis on the unity and simplicity of the 
divine nature. Amongst many of Luther’s contemporaries, however, the entire 
                                                
49 Luther, Galatians, pp. 28–9.  
50 Luther, Galatians, p. 32.  
51 Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae 2a 2ae, q.4 a.3 
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Augustinian heritage of the western church was called into question, and the doctrine 
of the trinity and its traditional conceptual apparatus was subject to direct and 
sustained critique. For the Spanish anti-trinitarian Michael Servetus, the classical 
doctrine of the trinity not only lacked scriptural support but proved an occasion for 
offense and derision amongst both Muslims and Jews and even (since all the works of 
the Lord praise the one God) the beasts of the field.52 Likewise, the authors of the 
1605 Racovian Catechism, felt compelled to exhort trinitarian Christians to ask again 
whether they were not guilty of ‘the crime of polytheism, and consequently of 
idolatry’. The doctrine of the trinity is said here to contain ‘a palpable contradiction’, 
for ‘the essence of God is one, not in kind but in number’, since ‘a person is nothing 
else than an individual intelligent essence’, wherever we find ‘three numerical 
persons, there must necessarily, in like manner, be reckoned three individual 
essences’.53  
  The accusation that classical trinitarianism amounted to a poorly concealed 
tritheism was widely rehearsed and sharply rebuffed: God ‘so proclaims himself the 
sole God’, Calvin wrote, ‘as to offer himself to be contemplated clearly in three 
persons’. But this is not license to ‘image that God is threefold, or think God’s simple 
essence torn into three persons’. And drawing freely on the trinitarian writings of the 
fourth- and fifth-century church east and west, Calvin sought to uphold in a long 
series of disputations the intellectual coherence and theological cogency of the 
ingrained Christian habit of speaking to and of God in both essential and relative 
terms. In Servetus, Calvin finds a denial of the distinct reality of the three divine 
persons in the one, simple divine essence. Conflating the essential and personal, 
Servetus is, on the one hand, unable to think of the persons as genuinely distinct, and 
collapses the Son and Spirit together; on the other, he is unable to think of them as 
genuinely divine, and ‘indiscriminately mingles both the Son of God and the Spirit 
                                                
52 Michael Servetus, De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem (Hagenau, 1531), pp. 42–3: ‘quod omnibus 
his acrius est, quantum trinitatis traditio haec, fuerit Mahometanis, proh dolor, derisionis occasio, solus 
Deus novit. Iudaei etiam nostrae huic imaginationi adhaerere abhorrent, & stulticiam nostram cum 
Trinitate derident, ac propter huiusce blasphemias non credunt hunc esse illum  Messiam qui in Lege 
promissus est. Et non solum Mahometani & Hebraei, sed bestiae agri nobis illuderent, si phantasticam 
nostram sententiam perciperent, nam omnia opera Domini uni Deo benedicunt.’ 
53 The Racovian catechism, with notes and illustrations, translated from the Latin: to which is prefixed 
a sketch of the history of Unitarianism in Poland and the adjacent countries (London: Longman, Hurst, 
Rees, Orme, & Brown, 1818), p. 33.  
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with created beings generally’.54 The consequences are manifold: in trinitarian 
theology, in christology, and in what Calvin calls Servetus’ ‘Manichean delusion’—
the claim that the human soul is the product of a divine emanation, ‘a derivative of 
God’s substance, as if some portion of immeasurable divinity had flowed into man’.55 
In rejecting the received language of essence and persons, Servetus accounts for the 
relation of the Father, Son, and Spirit in terms of a substance–accident idiom; as a 
result, God is rendered a complex being, vulnerable to the vagaries of historical 
change, not finally different from the human creatures with whom he relates. In 
contrast, in the Italian antitrinitarian Valentine Gentile, Calvin finds not so much a 
modalist denial of the eternal reality of the persons but a quasi-Arian subordination of 
the Son and Spirit to the Father. For Valentine, to acknowledge the procession of the 
Son and Spirit from the Father necessarily is to recognise the Father as essentiator—
the one who communicates the divine essence to the Son and Spirit—so that the 
Father alone is ‘truly and properly the sole God’.56 Again a direct appeal to the 
scripture’s patterned identification of God is central to Calvin’s response:  
when we profess to believe in one God, under the name of God is understood a 
single, simple essence, in which we comprehend three persons, or hypostases. 
Therefore, whenever the name of God is mentioned [in scripture] without 
particularization, there are designated no less the Son and Spirit than the Father; but 
where the Son is joined to the Father, then the relation of the two enters in; and so we 
distinguish among the persons. But because the peculiar qualities in the persons carry 
an order within them, e.g., in the Father is the beginning and the source, so often as 
mention is made of the Father and the Son together, or the Spirit, the name of God is 
peculiarly applied to the Father. In this way, the unity of essence is retained, and a 
reasoned order is kept, which yet takes nothing away from the deity of the Son and 
Spirit.57 
This is not a recommendation of the technical vocabulary of classical 
trinitarian reasoning for its own sake. For Calvin, nothing turns, for example, on the 
use of the term ‘person’ itself: traditional sources use other terms—‘subsistence’ or 
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‘prosopa’ or ‘substance’—to render the Greek hypostasis, which scripture (Heb. 1.3) 
uses to indicate the distinctive property of the Father. The crucial point is that in 
scripture ‘three are spoken of, each of which is entirely God’ and yet it also makes it 
clear that ‘there is not more than one God’.58 In his conviction that the doctrine of the 
trinity properly serves an exegetical end, arising from and tending towards the 
church’s reading of holy scripture as the textual location of God’s salutary self-
display; in his insistence that theological terms and concepts have no independent 
standing but strictly serve the ineffable realities they indicate (so that one ought not 
take prevailing interest in the semantic potential of theological terms such as 
‘person’); and in his untroubled assertion that ‘the essence of God is simple and 
undivided, and he contains all in himself, without proportion or derivation, but in 
integral perfection’59—in all this Calvin gives voice to a set of theological instincts 
deeply embedded in the trinitarian tradition.   
He did so with a strong sense that doctrinal purity, ecclesial unity, and civic 
security and liberty were mutually entailing. The pure and sound teaching of the faith 
served the edification of the one church and human flourishing in civil community, 
while it was the principal end of civil government ‘to cherish and protect the outward 
worship of God, to defend sound doctrine of piety and the position of the church, and 
to adjust our life to human society’—in short, to ‘provid[e] that a public manifestation 
of religion may exist among Christians, and that humanity be maintained among 
men’.60 Calvin maintained this position as a third way beyond an eschatological-
revolutionary trajectory of political thought arising out of the so-called radical 
reformation and a political naturalism in which an interest in the techniques of power, 
freedom, and stability displaced language of divinely ordered civic ends.61  
In his doctrine of the unified divine governance of the regimen spirituale and 
regimen politicum, Calvin thus proposed a theological-political vision in which 
church and state were granted a proper dignity and distinctiveness within an 
embracing vision of the movement of creation under the providential care of the 
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triune God.62 For Calvin, as for the other magisterial reformers, any ‘natural’ law or 
order, while universally valid, evident, and effective, was unreservedly a divine law—
an ordinance of the one, true God.63 Luther spoke of two kingdoms but of a single 
power: ‘Die Gewalt aber, die überall besteht, die ist von Gott verordnet’.64 There 
were, in other words, no kingdoms, be they secular or sacred, nor laws, be they the 
Decalogue or some form of natural moral law, independent of God’s creative, 
providential and redemptive ordering.  
In the complex intellectual and social-political conditions of the seventeenth 
century, this integrative trinitarian vision came under severe strain. The so-called wars 
of religion motivated a search for a non-sectarian vocabulary of civic identity and 
generally available resources for the pacific negotiation of convictional difference. 
The new experimental sciences gained prestige at the expense of older, textually 
mediated traditions of learning. And the Renaissance recovery of antique scepticism 
fed a widespread taste for a humane incredulity in face of confessional certainties 
whose more influential expressions included Descartes’ rationalism and Spinoza’s 
republicanism. In this context, one may see a growing tendency in post-Reformation 
Protestant theology to leverage for apologetic purposes the distinction between the 
order of creation and the order of salvation, the ‘natural’ knowledge of God given 
through the created order and the voice of conscience and the knowledge of God 
granted to the elect in the Word by the Spirit.  
 The work of Immanuel Kant may be seen at once as a culmination of and a 
decisive judgment upon these developments. Determining that theoretical reason 
could not make good on its promise to deliver a reliable speculative proof for the 
existence of a morally relevant deity, Kant concludes: ‘The idea of a moral rule of the 
world is a task for our practical reason: Our concern is not so much to know what he 
is in himself (his nature) but what he is for us as moral beings.’65 God is characterised 
here as the divine lawgiver whose order may be discerned in ‘the starry heavens 
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above’ and ‘the moral law within’—the latter in particular understood to be accessible 
‘to all human reason and … met with in the religion of most civilized peoples.’66 But 
if Kant’s program intends to safeguards a universal grounding for religion in moral 
reason, it appears to do so—or so its critics have judged—by emptying Christianity in 
particular and religion in general of distinctive content: ‘Only the pure faith of 
religion, based entirely on reason, can be recognized as necessary and hence as the 
one which exclusively marks out the true church.’67 Because of their formal proximity 
to the certain truths of reason, Kant feels able to develop rational accounts of certain 
key Christian doctrines, including the person of Christ, the kingdom of God, and (to 
great controversy) sin as ‘radical evil’. He further attempts to show that a trinitarian 
specification about God can be amenable to a threefold understanding of God’s will 
for human morality; but in discharging this proper function it meets its strict limit: ‘if 
this very faith (in a divine trinity) were to be regarded not just as the representation of 
a practical idea, but as a faith that ought to represent what God is in himself, it would 
be a mystery surpassing all human concepts, hence unsuited to a revelation humanly 
comprehensible, and could only be declared in this respect a mystery’.68 What is of 
primary interest is God’s moral will for the world; the doctrine of the trinity is 
serviceable in relation to this interest, and can tell us nothing of God life in se. 
 Kant thus transforms and sharpens to the point of separation the traditional 
distinction between what can be said of God’s inward life and what is said of God’s 
relationship to the world, holding that any particular deliverances of statutory 
religions must be justified before the bar of natural religion, with its practically 
necessary conception of God as the source and guarantor of the universally available 
and binding moral law.  
Accepting Kant’s critique of traditional metaphysical proofs for God’s 
existence but resisting his attempts to ground religion in morality, Scheiermacher 
sought to demonstrate that while religion always in fact is entangled with concrete 
acts of knowing and doing, and while it shares with metaphysics and with moral 
philosophy an interest in the universe and the relationship of the human person to the 
universe, it nevertheless has its own distinctive reality as ‘intuition and feeling’:  
Sie [die Religion] begehrt nicht das Universum seiner Natur nach zu bestimmen und 
zu erklären wie die Metaphysik, sie begehrt nicht aus Kraft der Freiheit und der 
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göttlichen Willkühr des Menschen es fortzubilden und fertig zu machen wie die 
Moral. Ihr Wesen ist weder Denken noch Handeln, sondern Anschauung und Gefühl. 
Anschauen will sie das Universum, in seinen eigenen Darstellungen und Handlungen 
will sie es andächtig belauschen, von seinen unmittlebaren Einflüßen will sie sich in 
kindlicher Paßivität ergreifen und erfüllen laßen.69 
  
Schleiermacher later would develop a more formally articulated account of the 
feeling of absolute dependence (das schlechthinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl), where 
Gefühl means something like ‘a pre-reflective harmony or at-one-ness between 
oneself and one’s environing circumstances’—one that ‘includes a kind of 
comportment or disposition towards those circumstances’, so that it can direct acts of 
knowing and doing.70 The awareness of being absolutely dependent is at once 
undeniably real and inexplicable apart from reference to a reality that transcends the 
world of reciprocal relations in which human moral agency is exercised. Human 
beings stand in complex relations of relative dependence and freedom, responsiveness 
and initiative with other human beings and with nonhuman creatures. Within this 
causal nexus, there is no human space of unconditioned novelty or total dependence 
(the former would render human knowledge radically insecure, the latter is corrosive 
on human freedom and so on morality). However, precisely within this network of 
relations human beings may and do have a precognitive awareness of being utterly 
from another, wholly dependent in every relative dependence and relative freedom. 
This awareness or feeling is the anthropological index of ‘religion’; the whence of this 
feeling is God. Crucially, this sense of radical reliance never penetrates the 
consciousness in isolation; it always attends concrete perceptions of and intentions 
towards the world.  
And so ‘religion’ always takes shape in a culturally textured form—as this or 
that tradition of religious expression. In Schleiermacher’s typology of religious 
experience, Christianity, as ‘a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of 
religion’ belongs in a class with Judaism and Islam (‘religion’ here is, crucially, 
rendered in a genus-species categorical scheme); and yet it is ‘essentially 
distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the 
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redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth’.71 On this account, Jesus is the 
uniquely and unsurpassably necessary point of historical reference for the Christian 
experience of God; the feeling of absolute dependence is, for Christian faith, 
inseparable from an awareness of the dynamics of sin and grace in human life as this 
is perfectly revealed and irreversibly transformed in the life and death of Jesus Christ. 
But for Schleiermacher, Christian theology can affirm the unique significance of 
Jesus without confessing his divinity in traditional incarnational terms. 
 For all their differences, Schleiermacher and Kant are united in a conviction 
that Christian theology can indeed retain a trinitarian understanding of God without 
sacrificing the intelligibility of the faith in a modern age. But they argue that it can do 
so only to the extent that the doctrine is placed on a new footing, phrased in a new 
idiom, and put to a new use. No longer is it to be conceived directly as a deliverance 
of divine revelation straightforwardly attested in scripture and received in faith as the 
sum of Christian doctrine. Rather, it appears as a capstone to a set of primary 
reflections on the structure of human moral agency or Christian religious experience.  
Henceforth ‘God’ is to be conceived as the source and guarantor of the moral law or 
the ultimate ‘whence’ of the feeling of absolute dependence; knowledge of God is 
thus strictly indexed to human self-awareness; traditional claims to knowledge of the 
divine life in se on the basis of scriptural revelation are foresworn as speculative, 
conceptually outmoded, and of strictly limited relevance. Whether Schleiermacher 
was justified in identifying the consciousness of being absolutely dependent as the 
essence of religion or the whence of this feeling as the God of faith remained a matter 
of controversy well into the twentieth century.72 But his decision systematically to 
defer treatment of the doctrine of the trinity to the conclusion of his theological 
system was at once indicative of a prevailing trend and widely influential.73  
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 Thus already in his 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel could 
observe that ‘dogmas such as those of the Trinity … have been put in the shadows by 
theology itself’.74 Whereas for Kant and Schleiermacher religion points to a divine 
reality beyond or behind history known as the postulated term of the moral law or 
religious experience, for Hegel the history of the religious-cultural life of humanity is 
immediately implicated in the divine reality. God is conceived as dynamic Spirit who 
arrives at its fullness in a movement of self-realisation through creative-redemptive 
self-abnegation. And it is in this way that Hegel can identify the doctrine of the 
incarnation of God in Jesus Christ at the centre of the Christian faith: 
This incarnation of the divine Being, or the fact that it essentially and directly has the 
shape of self-consciousness, is the simple content of the absolute religion. In this 
religion, the divine Being is known as Spirit, or this religion is the consciousness of 
the divine Being that it is Spirit. For Spirit is the knowledge of oneself in the 
externalisation of oneself; the being that is the movement of retaining its self-identity 
in its otherness. This, however, is Substance, insofar as Substance is, in its accidents, 
at the same time reflected into itself, not indifferent to them as to something 
unessential or present in them as in an alien element, but in them it is within itself, 
i.e., insofar as it is Subject or Self. Consequently, in this religion the divine Being is 
revealed. Its being revealed obviously consists in this, that what it is, is known. But it 
is known precisely in its being known as Spirit, as a Being that is essentially a self-
conscious Being. … Spirit is known as self-consciousness and to this self-
consciousness it is immediately revealed, for Spirit is this self-consciousness itself. 
The divine nature is the same as the human, and it is this unity that is beheld.75  
 
The passage illustrates three crucial aspects of Hegel’s project: First, reflection 
upon the relation between God and the world in Christian theology is centred on the 
doctrine of the incarnation understood as the self-revelation of the divine subject. 
Second, the language of Christian faith is secured through a process of translation in 
which the scriptural and traditional theological representations of God are 
systematically restated in more philosophically refined terms. Third, a commitment to 
a trinitarian understanding of self-actualizing, self-revealing Spirit is the ‘fundamental 
characteristic’ of Christian faith and the reason why it can be characterised as the 
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‘consummate’ religion.76 Hegel essentially holds that history itself bears the 
developing self-realization of the Absolute and that this self-realization is indeed the 
truth of the content of the Trinity;77 the traditional doctrine of the three divine persons 
is taken up in an account of three ‘moments’ of the one absolute Subject; and what 
have traditionally were taken to be eternally realised relations within God now are 
identified with the stuff of history: there is no God behind or beyond history, but 
rather the self-realization of the Absolute is history. Signs of knowledge of the 
movement of the Spirit are present widely in human culture: ‘one can point to a 
countless number of forms in which the content of the Trinity appeared distinctly and 
in various religions’;78 but no where is human knowledge of God transparent to the 
movement of divine self-consciousness as in Christianity, the consummate religion.  
 In rough summary: Hegel presents us with a precise counterpart to the account 
of the knowledge of God we encounter in Kant and Schleiermacher. For the latter, 
historical phenomena may represent but do not contain the divine presence; God 
remains, as it were, ‘behind’ his historical appearances. In Hegel, the current of 
thought tends (in a vastly long and complex course of argument) towards a quasi-
pantheistic identification of God and history; the triune self-realization of the 
Absolute is the singularly real. Taken as representatives of general trends in 
nineteenth-century trinitarian theology, Kant and Schleiermacher tend towards a sharp 
distinction between God in se and God ad extra, between the so-called immanent and 
economic trinity.79 Hegel, on the other hand, collapses these two notions together, so 
that it becomes—so Hegel’s critics argued—impossible to conceive of God without 
the world or properly to ascribe a proper integrity and relative independence to 
creation.  
 In characterising the relationship between Christianity and other religious 
traditions, Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel commonly rely upon a developmental 
discourse to argue that Christianity is the ‘highest’—perhaps even the unsurpassably 
highest—stage of human religious history. For all three, Judaism represents in some 
sense the most significant religious ‘other’, distinguished from Christianity as a 
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‘lower’ form of monotheistic religion. Kant and Schleiermacher both suggest that 
Judaism’s own internal possibilities, particularly its putative legalism,80 made it 
incapable of any higher synthesis;81 and Schleiermacher went so far as to argue that 
‘Christianity would not have been received by the Jews even as much as it was, had 
they not been permeated by … foreign elements’ i.e., by the cultural forces of 
Hellenism.82 And for both Kant and Schleiermacher, in a move that is determinative 
for many accounts to follow, Judaism and Christianity are formally related as 
instances of the general type ‘religion’. For Hegel, while Judaism does bear a kind of 
ontological weight because of its constituency in the self-realization of Absolute 
Spirit (as evident in its theological insights), there is otherwise little or no internal 
connection between Christianity and Judaism, and the latter remains limited by its 
nationalism and the abstract nature of its law.83 To many later readers, these figures 
seemed largely incapable of treating Judaism as a witness to any distinctive truth of 
abiding significance. And many of their heirs struggled to regain any concrete sense 
of the significance of Judaism for the Christian doctrine of God.  
 
Trinitarian theology, religion, and the religions 
The judgment of twentieth-century theology on the achievements of Schleiermacher, 
Hegel, and their heirs, has not been uniformly positive. Provoked by what he 
perceived to be the entanglements of the Protestant churches in a materialist, 
individualist, and militarized culture, Karl Barth developed a powerful critique of 
modern Protestant theology, tracing its proximate roots to a resurgent modalism that 
left Christian claims about God without a basis in reality. 
Gerade der Antitrinitarismus kommt unvermeidlich in das Dilemma, entweder die 
Offenbarung oder die Einheit Gottes zu leugnen , und darum ist die alte Kirche, ist 
noch Calvin so scharf gegen ihn vorgegangen. Behauptet er nämlich die Offenbarung, 
ohne doch die wesentliche Gottheit des Sohnes und des Geistes anerkennen zu 
wollen, so kann er einfach nicht anders, als in der Offenbarung irgendwie ein Drittes, 
das nicht Gott ist, zwischen Gott und den Menschen hineinschieben. Antitrinitarismus 
heißt in jeder Form, sofern er nicht Leugnung der Offenbarung ist, Vergötzung der 
Offenbarung. … Er wird mit den Monarchianern, Modalisten und Sabellianern (hier 
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finden wir Schleiermacher und in seinen Spuren so ziemlich die ganze neuere 
Theologie) unter Beibehaltung der Wesensgleichheit der Personen in der Trinität 
doch nur eine Offenbarungsökonomie, in den Personen nur Erscheinungsweisen 
sehen, hinter denen sich Gottes eigentliches eines Wesen als etwas Höheres, Anderes 
verbergen würde. Als ob die Offenbarung geglaubt werden könnte und dürfte mit 
dem Hintergedanken, daß wir es in ihr nicht mit Gott, wie er ist, sondern nur mit 
Gott, wie er uns erscheint, nicht mit seinem τρόπος ὑπάρξεως, sondern nur mit 
seinem τρόπος ἀποκαλύψεως zu tun hätten, als ob Gott Gott wäre in seiner 
Offenbarung, wenn er sich nicht in ihr offenbarte als der, der er ist von Ewigkeit zu 
Ewigkeit und in aller Tiefe seines Wesens.84 
 
 Thus Barth sought to recover a basis for Christian speech about God in a 
trinitarian doctrine of God’s self-revelation—one that admitted no ‘gap’ between 
God’s eternal being and his act. Both his sense that the pressing problem in modern 
theology is a kind of dualism that undermined Christian confidence in the gospel of 
Jesus Christ—his lingering worry about a ‘God behind God’—and his attempts to 
develop a christologically focused account of the eternally free and boundlessly 
capacious grace of God towards sinful human beings proved enormously influential. 
Barth himself did not countenance a simple turn from Schleiermacher to Hegel; but a 
sense that the doctrine of the trinity functions to hold the language of being and 
history, the eternal life of God and his immediate involvement in the world, in the 
closest possible connection runs throughout much of the writing of the period. Here 
we may note Karl Rahner’s claim that there ‘must be a connection between Trinity 
and man’ and his famous attempt to formulate this connection in the thesis that ‘the 
“economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and the “immanent” Trinity is the 
“economic” Trinity’.85 
  This reconsideration of fundamental questions about the relation of the 
trinitarian life of God and the creative and saving activity of God in the world has 
taken place alongside a further intensive reconsideration of the shape of God’s 
enacted faithfulness to his people—one occasioned not least by the deeply troubled 
history of European and global Judaism in the twentieth-century. Contemporary 
Christian theology accordingly is marked by a wide-ranging endeavour to recapture 
the significance of a distinctively Christian identification of God as trinity whilst 
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bringing this doctrine centrally to bear both in reconsideration of the relation between 
Christianity and other religions and in critical theological evaluation the very notion 
of ‘religion’ itself.86 We may discern in this work at least two complementary 
trajectories of thought. 
The first centrally entails the Christian theological analysis of the reality and 
validity of non-Christian religions. We may take as an example of this line of 
approach a 1956 essay by the French Jesuit Jean Daniélou, Dieu et Nous.87 Lamenting 
the lack of sustained attention to the history of non-Christian religions as a matter of 
theological concern, Daniélou also regretted the fact that popular discussion of the 
relation of Christianity to other religious traditions tended often to pursue strategies of 
assimilation, identifying Christianity with its cultural form and drawing it into the 
closest possible relation to other forms of observed human religious behaviour.88 Thus 
Christianity is treated as ‘a phase in the religious evolution of mankind’ or simply as 
one religion among many, all commonly grounded in the transcendental unity of 
religion. For Daniélou, such historicist and idealist-pluralist analyses are profoundly 
unsatisfying, trading on a category mistake:  
We utterly reject such evolutionary and syncretistic theories. Christianity 
cannot, any more than Judaism, be described as a manifestation of an 
immanent evolution of the religious genius of mankind, of which these two are 
merely the relatively higher expressions. They are interventions in history of a 
transcendent God who introduces man into a domain which is radically 
opposed to him.89 
 
 Christianity is not another episode in the history of religion but, with Judaism, 
an element in the history of revelation, a history authoritatively attested in the 
scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The foundational acts of this history—
exodus, Sinai, incarnation, Pentecost—are unique and unrepeatable; and in the divine 
wisdom, they cohere as a unified whole. This whole is the history of salvation, 
gradually unfolding as ‘a course of divine instruction’ in which humanity is drawn 
first to recognise God as the transcendent creator and ruler of all things and then to 
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know the mystery of God’s life as trinity.90 Attuned to the scriptural witness to the 
mirabilia Dei, Christian theology takes as its task not the attempt to identify a place 
for Christianity within the religions of the world so much as understand ‘the 
theological status of the history of religion, the place of the history of religion in the 
history of salvation’.91  
 Daniélou found in the Thomistic maxim that grace does not destroy but 
perfects nature (gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit) the ground for what he 
considered a more positive account of non-Christian religions than was offered in 
much patristic theology and in Protestant theology after Barth.92 ‘It is indeed a 
principle of the revelational sequence’, he argued, ‘that a new revelation does not 
destroy, but takes over the values of the previous revelation’.93 And this becomes the 
touchstone for Daniélou’s narration of the religious history of humanity from early 
‘cosmic religions’ (inchoate responses to the revelation of God in the created order), 
through the emergence of monotheistic faith on the basis of God’s special revelation 
to Abraham and to Israel, to the ‘supreme revelation of God’ in the Son and Spirit. In 
this account, ‘the whole history of salvation may be considered as a gradual unveiling 
of the ineffable Trinity’, a slow instruction in the truth that ‘the Trinity of Persons 
constitutes the structure of Being, and that love is therefore as primary as existence’.94 
This first trajectory is distinct from but may inform a second, which we may 
simply call Christian involvement in interfaith dialogue. The contexts and ends of 
such conversation may be variously construed: as a missionary enterprise, intending 
the conversion of the religiously ‘other’; as an act of Christian witness in a pluralist 
society, an exposure of Christian faith to others and just so to God; as an exercise in 
hospitality, one undertaken for its own sake as a non-instrumental human good, but 
one which nevertheless may exemplify a civility and generosity that tends towards 
greater political-social understanding. Again, this dialogue may take many forms: the 
                                                
90 Daniélou, God and Us, p. 81; cf. 119: ‘It was first necessary that faith in the unity of God, in 
monotheism, should be profoundly rooted in a human race always inclined towards polytheism, in 
order that, at the heart of that unity, the Trinity of Persons could be revealed without any danger’. 
91 Daniélou, God and Us, p. 12. 
92 Daniélou, God and Us, p. 11; cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia q. 1 a.8. See further the reflections 
on variations within recent Roman Catholic theology on the relation of nature and grace and its bearing 
on Christian theologies of the religions in G. D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity (T&T 
Clark, 2000), pp. 102–4.  
93 Daniélou, God and Us, p. 20. 
94 Daniélou, God and Us, pp. 118–19. The fundamental theological orientation of Daniélou’s analysis 
anticipates the important statement of the Second Vatican Council on the church’s relation to non-
Christian religions, Nostra aetate (see Tanner, Decrees, 2:968–71). 
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establishment of formal routines of interfaith exchange in state-sponsored institutions; 
regular communal gatherings dedicated to mutual exploration and instruction in 
religious texts and themes;95 a simple readiness to encounter religiously interested 
others as and when occasion arises.  
The political and cultural dynamics motivating and nourishing such practices 
of interreligious encounter complex and fluid; the prospects for genuinely 
transformative and pacific interfaith dialogue are unclear. Christian theology, 
precisely insofar as it confesses Jesus Christ as its risen Lord, observes and engages in 
such projects with a certain confidence, knowing that all such endeavors are governed 
by one who intends good for his people. It also will render its confession with a sense 
of high responsibility, knowing it will render an account to its risen Lord for its every 
word. And so in venturing to speak of God in a situation of religious pluralism, it will 
engage intensively with the history of Christian theological reflection upon the 
identity of God, seeking instruction and consolation in the communion of saints. And 
it will offer the (always partial, provisional) results of its investigations as a sign of its 
gratitude, its need, and its hope. In that way, it may make a small contribution to the 
life of faith and to the present flourishing of God’s world.  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                
95 Note here especially exercises in ‘scriptural reasoning’, on which see, e.g., D.F. Ford and C.C. 
Pecknold, eds, The Promise of Scriptural Reasoning (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).   
